ON the Battle of Zama - Locations and Pre-combat Positions, October 202 BC

A great primer on the Second Punic Wars and the last battle pitting Hannibal versus Scipio in North Africa. You can order from the publisher directly: https://ospreypublishing.com/zama-202-bc

THE INVASION OF NORTH AFRICA

The strategic situation of the western Mediterranean by 205 bc was clear cut: Rome had contained Hannibal in the Italian peninsula, driven the Carthaginians out of Iberia and now controlled Sardinia, Corsica and, most importantly, Sicily. The original vision of the elder Scipio – to take the war to the enemy – could now be realised. 

Scipio had been granted permission by the Roman senate to take volunteers and penal legions and mould them into an invasion force based in Sicily. He took his time to recruit and train enough men, to have a logistical system in place and gather enough intelligence while firming up his alliance with Masinissa. Perhaps he knew that invading North Africa would force Hannibal to leave Italy forever and banish the ‘scourge of Rome’ once and for all. 

THE LOCATION

The location of the battle of Zama has not yet been identified. No archaeological evidence exists to confirm any of the proposed sites, and conflicting ancient sources only add to the confusion. Livy’s comments on the location of the battle are as follows: 

Scipio took up his position not far from the city of Naragarra on ground which, in addition to other advantages, afforded a supply of water within range of missiles from the Roman lines. Hannibal selected some rising ground about four miles [6.5km] away, a safe and advantageous position, except that water had to be obtained from a distance. A spot was selected [for the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio] midway between the camps, which, to prevent any possibility of treachery, afforded a view on all sides. (Livy 30.29) 

The historians Gilbert and Colette Picard identify the location as not far from ‘Zama, the Massylian capital, probably in the plain of Siliana, where the road from Hadrumetum (Sousse) to Sicca (El Kef) crossed at a road leading directly from Carthage along the valley of Wadi Miliana’ (Picard and Picard, 1987, p. 265). Lazenby (1998, p. 218) believes it to have been fought near the town of El Kef (ancient Sicca Veneria), 

and places Seba Biar about 13km west of Zanfour. He writes that the battle was fought some distance from there, however, and about 5km from Scipio’s camp. The location of Scipio’s encampment is the key to placing the battlefield. Lazenby believes Naraggarra is too hilly and that Livy may have assimilated Naraggara and Margaron. However, the plain of Draa el Meinan (or Metnam), just south of the modern road P5 from Sidi Youssef to El Kef – about 27km from Sidi Youssef, and near the juncture with the road from Kasserine to El Kef – was suitable for accommodating large armies, in his view (Lazenby, 1998, p. 218.)

Hoyos arrives at a different conclusion:

[Hannibal’s] march went by Zama, one of several towns so named in the hinterland: probably the one later called Zama Regia (today a site called Seba Biar, fifteen miles south-east of El Kef). Zama, though only an encampment on the march, gave its name to the battle through a careless mistake by his biographer Nepos two centuries later. (Dexter, 2008, p. 107)

The German historian Johannes Kromayer and Austrian artillery officer Georg Veith expended considerable energy examining the various theories regarding the location of the battlefield. Their conclusion – accepted by many modern scholars – is that Scipio established his camp, or position, near Margaron (Henchir el Chemmam) and more precisely in the direction of the Sicca Veneria–Naraggara route west towards Numidia. Hannibal, they conclude, left Hadrumetum and force-marched his army either via Sidi Abd el Djedidi or Kairouan until he reached Zama (Seba Biar). Here, they argue, Hannibal sent out reconnoitering parties and subsequently moved toward Scipio’s consular army. The two armies probably faced one another across the plain of Draa el Meinan. Scipio’s camp was therefore located on the hill called Koudiat el Beheima, which also had access to water from the stream called Qued Ras el Ogla. Hannibal established his camp about 5.5km away on the waterless hill known as Koudiat Bongrine (Kromayer and Veith, 1903, p. 38)

ORDER OF BATTLE AT ZAMA

CARTHAGINIAN AND ALLIED (HANNIBAL BARCA)

The first line and elephants (c.10,000–12,000)

A large number of elephants were lined up in front of Hannibal’s infantry. The elephants were small and without towers.

Alongside the elephants were skirmishers from Hannibal’s first line composed of light and line infantry mercenaries. Their purpose was to protect the elephants against velites and to exploit any gaps the elephants might create. The rest of the first rank would be close by to join the penetration and provide protection for the skirmishers once the hastati advanced and clashed with the spearmen of the first line. 

The second line (c. 10,000–12,000)

Composed of Carthaginian citizen volunteers and conscripts, as well as Liby-Phoenician spearmen. 

The third line (c. 8,000)

The ‘old guard’ comprised Bruttian swordsmen and other veteran campaigners knowledgable in the martial arts of the Roman soldier. 

The left cavalry wing (Tychaeus)

2,000 Numidian horsemen.

The right cavalry wing 

Between 1,600 and 2,000 Carthaginian horse.

ROMAN AND ALLIED (PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO)

Roman legions V and VI

These legions, together with two allied ones, occupied the centre of the Roman line. 

Velites to the front as skirmishers (c.4,800). Their primary purpose was to eliminate the elephant threat.

Hastati in the front line (c.4,800).

Principes in the second line (c.4,800). Possiblly used to reinforce the front line and as a manoevre element when required.

Triarii in the third line (c.2,400). The last line of defence or a manoevre element during the climax of the battle.

Numidian infantry (c. 6,000)

The Numidian light and line infantry was positioned to the right of the legions. Some may have supported the cavalry. Appian tells us they suffered more casualties (4,000, including 2,500 dead) than the Romans.

Numidian cavalry (Masinissa)

The Numidian cavalry under Masinissa anchored the far right of the Roman army, with 4,000–6,000 horsemen.

Roman and allied cavalry (Laelius)

Laelius’s cavalry was on the far right (1,600–2,400 horesemen). They may have been supported by 1,600 Numidians led by Prince Dacamas.

THE OPENING PHASE OF THE BATTLE: DAYBREAK, 19 OCTOBER

The opposing armies marched out at daybreak ready to give battle. The opposing Numidian cavalry forces engaged first and skirmished for a while before Hannibal ordered the advance of his elephants. Some of the young and untrained elephants became unmanageable, fleeing headlong into the Carthaginian and Numidian lines. At this point, Massinissa seized the opportunity to drive off Hannibal’s loyal Numdians.

ROMANS AND ALLIES

1.  Numidian cavalry and light foot under Masinissa (4,000–6,000)

2. Numidian infantry (6,000)

3.  Allied Legion I

4. Roman Legion V

5.  Roman Legion VI

6. Allied Legion II

7.  Roman and allied cavalry under Laelius (1,600–2,400)

8. Numidian cavalry under Prince Dacamas (1,600)

CARTHAGINIANS AND ALLIES

A. Numidian cavalry under Tychaeus (2,000)

B. Hannibal’s veterans (6,000–8,000)

C. Libyan and Carthaginian infantry (Macedonians) (8,000–10,000)

D. Ligurian and Celtic mercenaries

E. Skirmishers and mercenaries (10,000–12,000)

F. Elephants (80)

G. Carthaginian cavalry (1,600–2,000)

Events

1.                               Hannibal’s elephants hit the main Roman battle line. 

2.                               Polybius writes: ‘But as they heard the horns and trumpets braying all around them, some of the elephants became unmanageable and rushed back upon the Numidian contingents of the Carthaginian army.’

3.                               The fleeing elephants allow Masinissa to advance quickly and deprive the Carthaginian left wing of its cavalry support.

4.                               The remaining elephants charge the Roman velites in the spaces between the maniples of the line. Although they inflict much damage on the enemy, they suffer heavily themselves. Some of the frightened elephants flee between the vacant spaces in the Roman lines, ‘the Romans letting them pass harmlessly along, according to Scipio’s orders.’

5.                               Other elephants flee to the right under a shower of missiles from the Roman and allied cavalry, until finally being driven clear from the field. 

6.                               As the elephants stampede, Laelius and Prince Dacamas advance, and force the Carthaginian cavalry into headlong flight. Masinissa joins in the pursuit on the Roman right flank.