US Strategies vis-a-vis Iraq and Iran

The United States was not as effective in dealing with threats posed by Iran and Iraq as it could have been. It created greater instability in the region with an ill-advised invasion of Iraq and a heavy-handed approach with Iran. Stability would have been better served with a less rigid diplomacy.

Iran’s threat to the stability of the region was the Islamic Republic’s desire to export its revolutionary ideals, notably in the American-protected oil-rich monarchies.[1] Threats included Iran’s hostility toward Israel, its support of the radical groups Hamas (1987) and Hizbollah (1982), and its drive for dual-technology nuclear power.

Iraq’s threat was driven by Saddam Hussein coveting disputed strategic ports and oil fields in Iran and Kuwait, his desire to be seen as the pre-eminent leader of the Arabic world, and his quest for weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, biological and chemical. The Iraqi military invaded Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990), and launched SCUD missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm (1990-91). Iraq’s supposed link to terrorism was another threat. Having removed Hussein from power in 2003, the United States created a new crisis in the region - a weakened Iraqi state which was exploited by Sunni fundamentalists while Iran expanded its influence.

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), launched by Iraq, resulted in the two hostile regimes exhausting themselves thereby preventing attacks on Israel and Western interests.[2] This was fortuitous for the US. Active American support to Iraq came after the Iran-Contra scandal of 1986 which saw the US selling arms to revolutionary Iran. In order to reassure its Arab allies, the US in effect created a second front by reflagging oil tankers, actively attacking Iranian vessels, and accidentally downing an Iranian civilian airliner.[3] This intervention led Iran to accept an UN-sponsored cease-fire. Iraq’s use of WMDs was contrary to international law, but was tolerated by the US and the UN. It compromised the values and morals of both.[4] The United States was able to prevent an Iranian victory and stunted the revolutionary zeal to export its Islamic ideals temporarily.[5]

The seemingly successful American strategy was premature. With the economic fall of the Soviet Union, Iraq looked for revenue for infrastructure and its war debt. It invaded Kuwait in 1990 to seize its wealth and disputed oil fields. The invasion surprised the US who depended on 50% of its oil imports from the region. Americans were concerned about a possible Iraqi seizure of Saudi oil fields.[6] By 1991, the US-led Operation Desert Storm saw the ejection of the Iraqis from Kuwait. The US did not seek a regime change in Baghdad because of potential post-war problems such as Iraq breaking into distinct ethno-religious lines.[7] President George H.W. Bush’s policy to curtail the rogue states of Iraq and Iran emerged successfully. The limited American strategic goal was met with Iraq’s retreat from Kuwait. As a result, the US increased its regional footprint and prestige in the region (a subsequent issue for al Qaeda) while becoming the dominant global power. Iraq under Hussein remained a curtailed threat.

Iran on the other hand was able to solidify its Islamic Republic because the Iraqi invasion awakened nationalism.[8] American support for Iraq did lessen Iranian revolutionary threats with the notable exceptions of Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Although Sharam Chubin proposes that solidarity with Palestine is in fact a ‘bulwark – a frontline – in Iran’s defence’.[9]

In 1993, President Clinton embraced the Dual Containment policy against Iran and Iraq, rejecting the traditional balance of power strategy as it had proven difficult. Iraq was to be contained, ideally leading to an internal regime change. This long-term strategy proved difficult for allies who by now had sanction fatigue. Hussein’s brinkmanship to end sanctions resulted in limited allied air strikes. The US looked for regime change by funding opposition groups with the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.[10]

US frustrations with Iraq and the UN led to a unilateral decision by President George W. Bush after September 11, 2001, to invade Iraq in 2003. The official justification for war was Iraq’s possession of WMDs and its support of global terrorism. Both accusations were false. Poor post-war planning led to a violent insurgency, and an eventual rise in sectarian violence, resulting in greater allied casualties primarily caused by Sunni militias.[11] Iraq descended into a civil war as Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurd vied to fill the power vacuum left by the dissolution of Hussein’s Ba’athist government and army. Alastair Finlan argues that US counterinsurgency operations failed because of poor political conditions, a reliance on flawed Israeli COIN methods, and the lack of intelligence.[12]

A US study group’s recommendation to withdraw from Iraq and Syria, thereby permitting Iranian regional influence to increase, was instead replaced with a military surge. The surge, the rise of Sunni tribes against al Qaeda, and bribes yielded some success.[13] The sectarian violence and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, however, allowed al Qaeda, later the Islamic State of Iraq (IS) and then the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), to expand its footprint, creating greater instability. The US withdrew its forces in 2011 but returned in 2014. By 2019, ISIS seems defeated and the Syrian civil war over. Iran expanded its regional hegemony. The US and regional allies still view Iran with great apprehension and the Trump administration is in discussions to provide dual nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia to off-set Iranian gains. Recent American strategy in Iraq has been ineffective.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis surprised President Carter.[14]  When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1980, the Carter Doctrine emerged, guaranteeing its Arab allies’ security against Soviet encroachment and Iranian revolutionary threats.[15]

President Reagan viewed Iran an outlaw government given the 1983 Beirut bombings, and launched an international arms embargo which was circumvented by his administration with the Iran-Contra affair in 1985-86. Because of the scandal, the US had to commit to Iraq in the war with Iran to repair relations with its Arab allies.

Iran’s decision to oppose an Arab-Israeli settlement in 1991 (Madrid Summit) ended with President George H.W. Bush identifying Iran as a rogue state, one which seeks WMDs and supports global terrorism. The US issued a 1992 non-proliferation treaty banning technological exports to Iran and Iraq.

By 1993, the US policy of Dual Containment under President William Clinton sought to modify Iran’s behavior. As Lawrence Freedman notes, dual containment was to create an environment suitable for Arab-Israeli peacemaking.[16] However, Congress funded regime change. Iran’s continued support of radical groups and its possible involvement in the 1996 Khobar Tower bombing led to greater sanctions.

President George W. Bush’s 2002 speech labeled Iran as one part of an ‘Axis of Evil’.  His neoconservative administration wanted regime change. Iran, seeking nuclear technology and delivery systems, became a renewed concern for the US which was now struggling with insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. After the 2003 Iraq invasion, it became difficult to sell a war on Iran to the international community. A concern was a nationalist backlash in Iran, strengthening its government. Another was international condemnation in the aftermath of the invasion of 2003. Additionally, any attack on Iran could unleash a wave of global terror attacks.

President Barack Obama intensified sanctions in 2008. In an effort to curtail Iranian nuclear advances, covert operations, including cyber-attacks and assassinations, were launched.[17] The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan for Action, saw Iran agree to halt parts of its nuclear development in exchange for partial sanction relief. President Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018. The renewed sanctions have strengthened hard-liners in Iran who had opposed the deal. US policy against Iran has had some success but Iran exploited American regional failures.

American policy in the Middle East consists of the protection of Israel, control of access to oil and regional stability.[18] Israel is safe, oil is secure and Saddam Hussein was overthrown. Iraq was ejected from Kuwait and no longer threatens its neighbors. That is considered a success. But a by-product of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was an unintended destabilization resulting in brutal campaigns spearheaded by Islamic fundamentalists which also unsettled Syria. Iran has been successful in Lebanon and expanded its influence in Iraq and Afghanistan but Arab regimes were not toppled. Iran and Iraq have only been partially contained. Overall, US policies have been too rigid and Sisyphean, perhaps a more nuanced approach would have yielded better results.[19]

Bibliography

BOOKS

Axworthy and Michael. 2008. Iran: Empire of the Mind. London: Penguin Publishing.

Calvocoressi, Peter. 2009. World Politics since 1945, edited by Peter Calvocoressi. 9th ed. Harlow: Longman.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2009. A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East. Paperback ed. London: Phoenix.

Harkavy, Robert E. and Stephanie G. Neuman. 1985. The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Razoux, Pierre. 2015. The Iran-Iraq War, edited by Nicholas Elliott Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

JOURNALS

Aarts, Paul and Michael Renner. 1991. "Oil and the Gulf War." Middle East Report (171): 25-47. doi:10.2307/3013071. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013071.

Bennis, Phyllis. 2000. "And they Called it Peace": US Policy on Iraq." Middle East Report (215): 4-7. doi:10.2307/1520145. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1520145.

Bensahel, Nora. 2006. "Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction." Journal of Strategic Studies 29 (3): 453-473. doi:10.1080/01402390600765876. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600765876.

Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2012. "Testing the Surge: Why did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?" International Security 37 (1): 7-40. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00087. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23280403.

Chubin, Shahram. 2009. "Iran's Power in Context." Survival 51 (1): 165-190. doi:10.1080/00396330902749772. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330902749772.

Divine, Robert A. 2000. "The Persian Gulf War Revisited: Tactical Victory, Strategic Failure." Diplomatic History 24 (1): 129-138. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24914159.

Dobransky, Steve. 2014. "Baghdad at the Crossroads: Why the U.S. Failed in Iraq." Middle East Quarterly 21 (1): 1B. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1698285617.

Dodge, Toby. 2014. "Can Iraq be Saved?" Survival 56 (5): 7-20. doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.962795. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.962795.

Finlan, Alastair. 2005. "Articles: Trapped in the Dead Ground: US Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Iraq." Small Wars & Insurgencies 16 (1): 1-21. doi:10.1080/0959231042000322530. https://doi.org/10.1080/0959231042000322530.

Freedman, Lawrence and Efraim Karsh. 1991. "How Kuwait was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War." International Security 16 (2): 5-41. doi:10.2307/2539059. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539059.

Karsh, Efraim. 1987. "Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq War Revisited." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 64 (1): 83-95. doi:10.2307/2621495. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621495.

Sick, G. 1998. "Rethinking Dual Containment." Survival 40 (1): 5-32. doi:10.1080/00396338.1998.9688522. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.1998.9688522.

Takeyh, Ray. 2010. "The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment." Middle East Journal 64 (3): 365-383. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40783105.

Woods, Kevin M. and Mark E. Stout. 2010. "Saddam's Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of ‘Desert Storm’." Journal of Strategic Studies 33 (1): 5-41. doi:10.1080/01402391003603433. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402391003603433.

MULTIMEDIA

Analysis: The Iran-Iraq War's Legacy. Anonymous BBC, 2015. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06fkm3g.

Iran-Iraq War 1980 to 1988 - Part 3 of 3. Anonymous ITN Pro Video, 2010. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bmepR8seo0U.

Witness: Fighting in the Iran-Iraq War. Anonymous BBC, 2013. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01pnltd.

Cirincione, Joseph. 2003. Origins of Regime Change in Iraq. https://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/19/origins-of-regime-change-in-iraq-pub-1214.

Coats, Daniel R. 2019. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.

Faux, Jeff. 2016. "Why is Iran our Enemy?" The Nation, June 13. https://www.thenation.com/article/why-is-iran-our-enemy/.

BBC Iran and the West: The Man Who Changed the World. Directed by Delphine Jaudeau. BBC, 2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=91xuueQ7RmI&feature=related.

Katzman, Kenneth. 2019. Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options. CRS Report: Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf.

Toossi, Sina. 2015. "Deciphering Iran's Strategic Vision." Lobe Log, January 15. https://lobelog.com/DECIPHERING-IRANS-STRATEGIC-VISION/.

[1] Axworthy (2016), p.266 Iranian revolution was rooted in economics and corruption, not religion. Harvaky (1985) p.211 and Karsh (1987-88), p.88 Iran’s attempts to overthrow the Iraqi government was reason for invasion and Freedman (2008), p.159 perception of Iran as threat to Arab allies

[2] Razoux (2015), p.82

[3] Takeyh (2010), p.381 the downing of the civilian aircraft possible catalyst for peace

[4] Takeyh (2010), p.370

[5] Takeyh (2010), p.365

[6] Calvocoressi (2008), p.392

[7] Divine (2000), p.134

[8] Axworthy (2016), p.278

[9] Chubin (2009), p.171

[10] Calvocoressi (2008), p.398

[11] Axworthy (2016), p.292 and Bensahel (2006), p.453

[12] Finlan (2003) pp.1, 13

[13] Biddle (2012) p. 36

[14] Freedman (2008) p.83 hostage crisis poisoned US-Iranian relations

[15] Razoux (2015), p. 75

[16] Freedman (2008) p.302 and Sick (1998) p.8

[17] Axworthy (2016) p.296 November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate - Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program and Chubin (2009) p. 169

[18] Bennis (2000) p.215

[19] Sick (1998) p. 26