On Iran - Is Iran a better strategic partner than Saudi Arabia? Yes! To what extent has Iran been a destabilising force in the Middle East since 1989?

The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 heralded a new era of politics in Iran.[1] One less grounded in its revolutionary fervor. Yet, Iran is seen as a destabilizing force in the Middle East by the United States and its regional allies Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States because, they argue, it seeks to export its revolution through the overthrow of Arab oil monarchies, its support of international terrorism, its anti-Israeli rhetoric and stance, and, lastly, its desire to acquire nuclear technology. Iran sees its actions as defensive for its own security and to redress the balance of power against the destabilizing forces of the United States, its allies and Sunni extremists. Iran’s grand strategy is more nuanced than acknowledged by its opponents. 

Iran’s foreign policy is rooted not only in its revolution but firmly in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) when it was opportunistically invaded by Saddam Hussein. Iran views the support given by the United States and Saudi Arabia to Iraq as a permanent mark on their relationships.[2] Saudi Arabia financed the Iraqi military while the United States provided intelligence which was also used in deadly chemical attacks on Iranian troops without condemnation from the international community. The United States actively engaged Iran ensuring the uninterrupted flow of oil, but it also resulted in the downing of an Iranian civilian airliner. By the end of the war, and its million dead, Iran was strategically isolated as the United States permanently allied with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.[3] Iran viewed the United States as a potential existential threat until the rise of the Islamic State in the aftermath of the 2003 American invasion of Iraq.[4] Iran sees itself fighting not a crusade, but occupation forces since 1979.[5]

            The collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), with the simultaneous rise of a hostile United States to unipolar power, meant Iran had to recover economically and militarily without foreign assistance. Its isolation led to self-sufficiency and an imperial design to secure oil trade routes for greater economic growth and power projection.[6] Therefore, Iran needed stability in the region for its own security. On its way, it has become a superpower despite efforts to contain and alter its political behavior.[7]

Iran stands accused of spreading its revolutionary ideals throughout the Shiite populations in the region, seeking to topple Sunni-controlled Arab oil monarchies. Shia Iran, under Ayatollah Khomeini, wanted to export its revolution and not just to Shiites throughout the Gulf states but also to the Palestinian cause and Hamas in 1987. An important message from Iran was that the oil-rich Arabs are self-indulgent, spoiled and weak whereas Iran expelled the Americans and beat back the powerful Iraqi army. 

Iran’s support of Shia Hezbollah and Sunni Palestinian Hamas is a destabilizing factor. During the war with Iraq, Iran expanded into Lebanon and Syria by supporting Hezbollah in 1982 when for first time in the modern era an Arab city was destroyed by a foreign invader, Israel. By 2000, and again in 2006, Israel was forced to retreat and important lessons were learned by the Iranians - it transitioned from conventional warfighting to its ascendancy in asymmetric war. Iran’s military innovation is as crucial as the machinegun was to the Great War (1914-18).[8] Its experiences in Lebanon shaped Iran’s political and military strategy. Using proxy forces avoided direct confrontations and conventional wars which Iran would most likely lose against the superior forces of the United States and Israel. And Iran proved more adept at using proxies than its enemies.[9] Asymmetric warfare allowed Iran to spend far less. In 2006, Iran spent 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product compared to Saudi Arabia’s 10 percent.[10] None of this would have been possible without the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Although Iran has committed acts of terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s, it has successfully transitioned to asymmetric warfare. Some of Iran’s previous acts of terrorism were in response to the assassination of Hezbollah general secretary Abbas Moussawi by Israel in 1992, and the downing of an Iranian civilian airliner by the Americans during the Iran-Iraq War.[11] Robert Baer argues that by the 1990s Iran was less looking like an exporter of its revolution and more like a universal, all-encompassing anti-colonialist strategic partner. And that the attacks on civilians on September 11, 2001, made Osama bin Laden and Saudi Arabians look morally bankrupt and Iran was beginning to act and look more like a statesman.[12]

Iran is a threat to Israel because of its asymmetric warfare power and its rhetoric against Israel has enforced this threat but the rhetoric no worse than what Arab states have been saying since Israel’s founding in 1948. The anti-Iranian rhetoric is equally visceral. Iran’s support of Lebanese and Palestinian fighters destabilizes the security of Israel.

Iran’s drive for dual-purpose nuclear technology is considered another threat to regional stability. Since 1989, Iran’s push for this technology is also driven by Sunni Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and Saddam’s quest and use of weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, Iran’s strategy does not rely on nuclear weapons as has been confirmed by the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate which states that Iran did not restart its nuclear weapons program.[13] This did not stop Israel and the United States from exploring attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.[14] Israel, however, is an unmonitored nuclear power and a threat to Iran. In 2015, Iran and the United States signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the Iran nuclear deal – which, in 2017, the Trump Administration withdrew from, insisting on unrealistic demands.[15] Iran’s military strength and threat rests on a world-class asymmetrical warfighting ability, a pool of disaffected fighters throughout the region, and its strict anti-colonial message.[16]

In the 2000s, Iran exploited American missteps especially after the United States made its grave strategic mistakes by invading Iran’s neighbors, Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). The invasions were a threat to the security of Iran.[17] The Americans did not help themselves by pursuing punishing policies with Iran since 1979 instead of seeking nuanced diplomatic relations.[18] This included funding of dissident Iranian groups, some of whom committed terrorist acts against Iranians, as the US sought regime change.[19] Iran ably exploited every misstep without resorting to direct military confrontations by supporting regional states and by engaging and organizing popular forces.[20] Iran is not an existential threat to the United States.[21] And yet, Iranian successes led the Commander of the United States Central Command to say, in 2017, that Iran is ‘the single greatest long-term threat to stability in this part of the world’.[22] In 2019, the United States named Iran’s military branch, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a terrorist organization.

Iran wants to control oil and gas trade routes. It has an understanding with Iraq, Syria, Kurdish-held areas as well as an oil partnership with Turkey.[23] This mutual understanding and Iran’s capability to shut down the Straits of Hormuz through military means make it a threat to the world’s oil supply. This threat was validated in the 2002 Millennium Challenge, an American wargame, which pitted a fictional commander of an unknown Middle Eastern country (Iran) against the newly-transformed network-centric American military. Using asymmetric warfare, it destroyed the attacking force.[24] Arguments have been made by senior American officers that there is no military solution in dealing with Iran because of its asymmetric counterstrike capabilities and its hardened underground bunker systems.[25] Iran has proven to be militarily successful, unlike its Arab neighbors, and its success must be attributed to its ascendancy in asymmetric warfare guided by a clear grand strategy.

Iran’s strategic ideological framework rests on the enhancement of its regional role and influence, and to safeguard the Islamic Republic’s sovereignty.[26] As such it will not accept another hostile Iraqi government. It repudiates a hostile unipolar United States which Tehran seeks to counterbalance with its biggest trading partner China.[27] Iran supposedly has desires to co-control of Islam’s holy sites of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia where Shiites are being discriminated against. [28] But this may no longer hold true as sectarian violence has spread throughout the region after the 2003 Iraqi invasion and the rise of al Qaeda in Iraq, and its offspring the Islamic State (IS), rebranded as the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS). Saudi Arabia’s support of Iraq during the war with Iran, and its desire to become the regional superpower, is a threat to Iran’s security. Iran has extended its influence since 1989 in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, the Gulf states and Gaza, in effect creating a buffer zone, but strategically Iran will not tolerate the dismantling of any country along religious lines as it creates instability. 

In 2015, Ian Dudgeon visited Iran and met with Iranian officials and think-tanks. He notes that Iran views the Islamic State, Israel, and Saudi Arabia along with the other Gulf States to be Iran’s greatest threats.[29]The US was not mentioned as Iran seeks to avoid any direct confrontation. Furthermore, it has no desire to annex any of its neighbors or near-neighbor territories. Instead, Iran worked successfully with its neighbors to combat extremist enemies and drug trafficking. It cooperates with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, Russia, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Oman as well as other countries including the European Union, notably Turkey. [30] Iran has emerged from its isolation and saw it work directly with Russia and indirectly with the United States in their efforts to establish regional stability.[31]

The Islamic State is the single greatest threat to regional stability. Its goal is to create an extremist caliphate, to eradicate moderate Sunnis, and to wage war against Shiites. Most troubling is its ability to exploit any power vacuums created by military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria. The direct threat to Tehran is the Islamic State supporting, recruiting and radicalizing Iranian Sunnis as well as the one million refugees within Iran’s border. At its height, IS (ISIS) had the ability to control neighboring countries, thereby weakening Iranian influence. These actions were sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States of Qatar, UAE and Bahrain. The US and Turkey also provided material support to terrorist organizations including ISIS and various Syrian anti-Assad militias. Iran used its military and proxies effectively but the Tehran government recognizes the need to have moderate religious leaders involved in political solutions.[32]

Saudi Arabia and its allies have taken actions to secure their own regional position and to weaken Iran by funding Wahhabi extremists and other Sunni militias. Saudi Arabia and the United States stand accused by Iran of supporting terrorist attacks on its soldiers and civilians.[33] Furthermore, Dudgeon notes, Iran reiterates that it does not seek a sectarian war.[34] It accepts Wahhabism as Saudi Arabia’s state’s religion and believes the majority of followers and clerics do not support the extremist elements. But Iran wants the Saudi government to reign in and distance itself from Wahhabism. 

Iran witnessed Iraq implode into an insurgency and then a sectarian civil war. This was primarily caused by poor post-war planning which included the de-Ba’athification of the government and the army. Al Qaeda, and especially the Islamic state, exploited the chaos which threatened to engulf the entire region. Because Iraq is a neighboring country and the Iraqi population is 65 percent Shiites, Iran intervened and believed its involvement created stability and prevented extremist spill-over into Iran. Iranian military operations were in support of the elected Iraqi Shiite government and executed in conjunction with the Iraqi military. Iranian military planners also deconflicted with the United States military. Iranian officials argue that their military operations are consistent with that of the Americans – to defeat extremists and bring stability to Iraq and the region.[35]

Regional instability is the complex relationships involving Syria, Turkey, the Kurds throughout the region, as well as the interference by the United States and its allies. Syria has supported Iran since the 1979 revolution and this can be attributed to the minority Alawite-Shiite government of the Assads. Iran’s assistance was requested by the legitimate government during the civil war. The instability is a product of American and Turkish support of largely unknown opposition forces. Iran seeks to avoid more political chaos in Syria, as had previously happened in Iraq. A dissolution of the Assad government could also lead to new concerns about a Kurdish homeland potentially involving Iran’s significant Kurdish population nearing seven percent resulting in internal instability. The crisis in Syria requires a political solution and needs to involve the Syrian government, along with stakeholders such as Iran and Russia with its historical ties in the region and its desire to retain its only naval presence in the Mediterranean in Syria.[36]

 Viewed from 2019, Iran’s 2015 analysis of Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu seems grounded in realpolitik and not in revolutionary fervor.[37] It sees the Netanyahu government does not intend to resolve the Palestinian issue. Israel is not interested in any settlement involving the return to pre-1967 borders. That instead it will hold onto, and expand, all its settlements for territorial retention. Iran views Israel as a crucial destabilizing factor in the Middle East. The founding of Hamas and Hizbollah was in direct response to Israeli aggression in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. In 2015, Iran’s support for the democratically elected Hamas is minimal[38] and Hezbollah’s focus is on supporting Assad and defeating the Islamic State. Iran blames the US for its failure in the peace process. 

Other Iranian concerns include Israel’s behavior by Netanyahu addressing the United States Congress directly in violation of American protocol, involving himself in American elections, circumventing the White House and insulting President Barack Obama in the process.[39] The American approach in the Middle East favors Israel despite its aggression and possession of nuclear weapons. Iran, on the other hand, receives sanctions because of its nuclear program. Robert Pollack notes a seemingly more hysterical commentary then proper discussions when it comes to nuclear technology and Iran.[40]

By 2019, anti-Iranian rhetoric has reached a fever pitch.[41] Political agenda drives the polemics on Iran that it ‘implicitly or implicitly associated with terrorism and fanaticism.[42] Charges that Iran is anti-Semitic are incorrect according to government officials who point out that Iran has the largest Jewish population outside of Israel in the Middle East. Iran claims to accept Israel as a state but not on the territories it acquired during the 1967 Six-Day War. Iran’s policy is anti-Zionist, but it would recognize Israel. It supports a two-state solution with other regional partners. However, American participation is required.[43]

Iran needs to disassociate from its negative image as a terrorist sponsor and the troublesome anti-Israeli rhetoric of its former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). Iran wants to be seen as a responsible partner in creating a peaceful, stabilized region which is achieved by seeking the middle ground with moderate partners. Something that seems distant given President Donald’s Trump’s neoconservative policies of supporting Israel outside of accepted international rules and not honoring the nuclear agreement with Iran. 

The Arab-axis, its American and Israeli allies view Iran as aggressors seeking to impose its revolutionary ideals. Iran, they argue, supports terrorist organizations including the Houthis in Yemen. They are concerned with potential Iranian territorial expansion. The Arab monarchs worry about Iran’s meddling in their internal affairs especially its support of the anti-western Muslim Brotherhood.[44] Iran’s support for attacks on Israel is another Arab concern. They argue that such attacks offer Israel an excuse not to pursue settlement negotiations. The Arabs see Iran waging wars through the use of proxies which is reciprocal, although the Arab allies deny supporting extremists. However, both have extremists on their side. Iran as well as the Arab allies view the Islamic State as a fundamental threat to regional stability. Additionally, they seek a resolution to the conflict in Syria. The Sunni-Shiite divide, according to the Arab point of view, emerged after the 1979 Revolution and that moderating forces are required to mitigate the situation. In the meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is but a few months away from completing its first nuclear reactor with the support of the Trump administration.[45]

Since 1989 Iran’s strategy is no longer rooted in Khomeini’s revolutionary ideals but has transformed into a nuanced, long-term effort for security and hegemony. It has morphed from an exporter of terrorism and revolutionary fervor into a regional superpower whose involvement in regional and international affairs can be seen as intimidating as that of any powerful state.  Farideh Farhi’s conclusion is that ‘overall Iran remains committed to the state and nonstate alliances it has laboriously created in order to project power and protect itself’.[46] Iran is among the most stable countries in the Middle East.[47] Its influence has expanded with the focus remaining on the integrity of its state by securing regional stability and not just by its revolutionary zeal. Its power is felt throughout the Middle East.

Bibliography

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[1] Phillips (2016) p.18

[2] PBS Frontline Bitter Rivals 1:19:00

[3] Farhi (2017) p.2

[4] Chubin (2009) p.1 

[5] Baer (2008) p.77

[6] Baer (2008) p.242

[7] Congressional Research Service  (March 6, 2019)

[8] Baer (2008) p.96

[9] Phillips (2016) p.166

[10] Baer (2008) p.100

[11] Boyd (March 19, 1992) 

[12] Baer (2008) p.202

[13] National Intelligence Estimate (October 31, 2007) 

[14] Cordesman (2012) p.4

[15] Dudgeon (2018) p.3 

[16] Baer (2008) p.111

[17] Hirst (2010) p.379

[18] Freedman (2008) p.511 for the American involvement in the Middle East and Burns (2019) p.285 

[19] Mearsheimer (2008) p.294

[20] Mousavian (2019) p.4 

[21] Tajbakhsh (2019) p.1

[22] Garamone (2017) 

[23] Ayoob (2018) p.1

[24] Finkel (2019) for an Israeli view on this exercise and the IDF’s recent failure in Lebanon and Borger (2002) article

[25] Hirst (2010) p.325 and Parsi (2007) p. 278

[26] Farhi (2017) pp.2-3

[27] Financial Tribune (2018) for China as trading partner and Noack (201) for rail development 

[28] Baer (2008) pp. 242-6

[29] Australian Institute of International Affairs (2017) on Dudgeon’s trip to Iran and Dudgeon (2015) p.2 

[30] Dudgeon (2015) p.2-3 

[31] Farhi (2017) p.3

[32] Dudgeon (2015) p.6

[33] Crist (2012) p.563 and Dilleen (2018) p.1 

[34] Dudgeon (2015) p.5

[35] See Cordesman (2012) and Dudgeon (2015) pp.6-7

[36] Dudgeon (2015) p.5

[37] Dudgeon (2015) pp.7-8

[38] Axworthy (2017) p.135

[39] Bacevich (2016) pp.352-3 and articles on US-Israeli discourse by Weiss (2018), Weinberg (2012), CBSNEWS (2015) and Pecquet (2012) 

[40] Pollack (2013) p.419

[41] Burchfield (2019) p.1 

[42] Ansari (2006) p.239

[43] Baer (2008) p.180, p.248

[44] Pargoo (2017) article

[45] Borger (2019) article

[46] Farhi (2017) p. 6 

[47] Shehadeh (2016) p.124